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Community Property in Bankruptcy: Laws of
Unintended Consequences
Margaret Dee McGarity*
For most people, the law is seemingly irrelevant to their
personal lives. They go about their business, doing whatever is
necessary to fulfill the needs and wants of daily life, all without the
intervention of lawyers or courts. If a large purchase requires both
a husband and wife's signatures, they both sign. If a credit card
application requires both signatures, perhaps because one spouse
has insufficient income to qualify alone, both sign. Even if only
one spouse signs the application, they pool their money to pay the
bill. Signatures are required for other activities, such as opening a
bank account or designating a death beneficiary. No problem; the
documents get signed. No one contemplates the legal
consequences of what they have done; they just do it.
When legal intervention is necessary, the role of the law is
often predictable. If you beat up someone in a bar, the police will
haul you away. If you do not make your car payments, a court will
eventually be involved, and you are riding your bike or the bus. An
individual might need a lawyer for a will, but he or she might use
cheaper self-help forms. The person using those self-help forms
probably feels the result is predictable because nothing has
happened to tell him otherwise. Courts are necessary for divorces,
but many people are forgoing legal advice even here. They will
never know which remedies are lost, but the divorce is completed.
Expectations are met.
When it comes to credit, most people expect to pay their debts
and avoid any legal consequences, but it does not always work that
way. Unemployment, divorce, and medical problems are leading
causes of bankruptcy, and these are not always foreseeable when
one incurs a debt. Similarly difficult to predict are auto accidents
for which an individual is found liable, or business failures with
substantial guaranteed debts or other personal liabilities. In
community property states,' all or most non-exempt community
property can be recovered to pay the debts of one spouse if those
debts were incurred for a community purpose, and most spouses in
those states probably realize that. Several community property
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1. Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, Washington and Wisconsin are all community property states. Alaska is
an opt-in community property state. Puerto Rico allows property to be owned as
community property, as do several Indian jurisdictions.
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states have modified collection rules to protect certain types of
property, especially for pre-marriage debts of one spouse, torts
incurred by one spouse, or for non-community purpose debts.
Nevertheless, the scope of creditors' collection rights often
surprises spouses. Many a heated dinner conversation has
undoubtedly taken place when one spouse's wages are garnished
for a debt incurred by the other.
In the 12-month period ending March 31, 2011, 1,571,183
bankruptcy cases were filed in the United States.2 As long as there
has been commercial activity, dealing with insolvency has been
necessary, a purpose which bankruptcy serves. Vigorous
commerce requires investment and credit, so the people with
money can make more money by putting that money into
enterprises run by people without money. Everyone wins when the
enterprise is successful. But the crops might fail, or the ship might
go down, and the leftovers have to be divided. Since there may be
multiple interested parties vying for limited resources, the process
might not be as easy as signing a joint credit application. Rules
become more important as the opportunity for adversary interests
increases. The writers of the Constitution provided that only
Congress could pass laws on bankruptcy, thereby enhancing
commerce by ensunn3g uniformity to a substantial extent when
insolvency occurred. Historically, when there has been a
bankruptcy law, it has applied only to liquidation and only to
businesses. The concept of discharge of debts by an individual
debtor has relatively recent origins, but it has caught on
dramatically.
The vast majority of recently filed cases are consumer cases,
filed by individuals seeking either a discharge of most of their
debts in chapter 7, or a relatively modest reorganization in chapter
13 that will enable the debtor to keep a house, car, or other secured
asset. Of total filings, 1,516,971 were non-business cases.4
Although the federal bankruptcy law, Title 11 of the United States
Code, is intended to be uniform, the obligations incurred by
individuals and the property rights related to debt collection are
generally creatures of state law. The overlay of a federal statute on
such disparate property systems as the common law title system
and community property system can create surprisingly different
2. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, 2010-2011 MARCH YEAR COMPARISON, http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/20 11/0
311 f.pdf.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 2.
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outcomes when a married person or couple files a bankruptcy
petition-the act that initiates a voluntary bankruptcy case. This
article deals with how community property and the individuals
who own it are affected by the bankruptcy filing of one or both
spouses. The examination of the interplay of state and federal law
in the bankruptcy context is also intended to address whether
community property, as a default property and debt system, meets
the needs and expectations of spouses in modem society.
I. THE STATUTES
The Bankruptcy Code has several provisions that are applicable
only to spouses in community property states. Other bankruptcy
statutes are, of course, also applicable to those cases, but this
section will summarize those that apply exclusively to community
property and community debts.
A. 11 U.S.C. § 541-Property of the Bankruptcy Estate
When a debtor files a bankruptcy case, it creates an estate,
which includes almost all of the debtor's property interests.
Generally, property interests and liabilities are created under state
law,s but federal law determines how those interests are treated in
the bankruptcy proceeding. When a married person in a
community property state files a bankruptcy petition, the estate
includes most types of interests the debtor has in property,
including separate property, plus some interests that arise post-
petition, and income earned on estate property. Some types of
property are excluded from the estate, such as qualified pension
plans and spendthrift trust interests, but exclusions must be
specifically excepted by statute to be excluded from the estate.6
Subsections 541(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Bankruptcy Code
provide for community property that is included in the estate of a
married person. First, all community property under the sole,
equal, or joint management and control of the debtor comes into
the estate. This is most community property. Second, the estate
includes community property that is subject to recovery for a claim
against the debtor or for a claim against the debtor and the debtor's
spouse. This encompasses certain assets not under the sole, equal,
or joint management and control of the debtor that is nonetheless
available to satisfy certain claims.
5. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)-(e) (2006).
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B. 11 U.S. C. § 101(7)-Definition of "Community Claim"
Just as property rights in community property states differ from
common law property rights, the rights of creditors to collect from
the debtor's assets-and assets of the debtor's spouse-are also
different. If a creditor has the right under state law to collect its
debt from community property defined under 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(2), it has a community claim, which carries rights to collect
from the bankruptcy estate. The creditor meets this definition even
if there are no such assets actually in the estate. Thus, the
creditor's hypothetical collection rights with respect to
classifications of community property under state law must be
analyzed in order to determine whether a particular creditor meets
the definition.
By way of example, a pre-marriage creditor of the non-filing
spouse of a bankruptcy debtor might be a community claim holder.
If, under state law, that creditor could recover from community
property assets generated only by the non-debtor spouse, such as
the community property wages of the spouse that incurred the debt
who is not the bankruptcy debtor, that creditor would meet the
definition of a community claim holder. This definition applies
even if no such wages are being earned or accumulated.
Section 342(a) provides that the holder of a community claim
is entitled to notice of the filing of a bankruptcy case. The practical
effect of this requirement is that a married debtor in a community
property estate who files a bankruptcy case without his or her
spouse as a joint debtor must give notice to creditors whose
community debts were incurred by the non-filing spouse as well as
the debtor. If the non-filing spouse is not forthcoming with this
information, community claimants might not receive notice of the
bankruptcy, and the debtor's rights might be adversely affected.
C. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (3), (b)-Discharge Injunction Protecting
After-Acquired Community Property
When one spouse completes all of the requirements of a
bankruptcy case, he or she receives a "discharge" in the absence of
a successful objection. This discharge is an injunction prohibiting
community claimants holding dischargeable debts (not all debts are
subject to discharge) from collecting those debts. Because an
interest in community property is an undivided interest in the entire
asset, this section protects the interests of both the debtor and his
or her spouse in community property acquired after the
bankruptcy, even if only one spouse filed. If there is an objection
to the dischargeability of a debt incurred by the debtor's spouse,
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such as an objection alleging fraud, and that objection is made
within the time limits set for such objections in the debtor's case,
neither of the spouses' interests in after-acquired community
property is protected. Similarly, under subsection (b), this
protection does not apply if the debtor's spouse would be denied a
discharge in a hypothetical case the spouse filed at the same time
as the debtor's case.7
D. 11 U.S.C. § 726(c)-Distribution of Community Property in the
Estate
This section establishes sub-estates for distribution of
community property and separate property to creditors holding
community claims and non-community claims. Depending on the
existence of the various classifications of property, certain
creditors might be able to collect from assets not available under
state law.8
II. SCENARIOS
Many legal concepts appear to be based on wise and fair
principles in the abstract, but when they are applied to real people
in a variety of real world situations, problems arise. The same
could be said of the law applying to assets and liabilities in
community property states. Community property embraces the
concept of partnership and sharing, and it supposedly provides
protection and benefits to a spouse who earns little or nothing in
the work force but is an equally valuable member of the marriage.
Historically, when spouses rarely separated and never divorced,
community property was one way to protect spouses who were
without direct access to the economy. Until recently, sole
management and control of community property by the husband
was the rule. Nevertheless, if a husband died or absconded, the
wife would be entitled to half the couple's assets, thereby affording
her some economic protection. The concept also recognized the
value of both spouses' contributions to work and to the family. The
glory of this sharing concept drowned out the voices of dissent,
which focused mainly on practical application when the Uniform
7. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004, 4007.
8. See 6 LAWRENCE P. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 726.05
(Matthew Bender 16th ed. 2009); see also In re Provenza, 316 B.R. 177 (Bankr.
E.D. La. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 82 Fed. App'x. 101 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Marital Property Act was being debated before it eventually
became law in Wisconsin.9
Hard economic times can arise for married couples anywhere,
and couples in community property states are not immune. For
many, bankruptcy is the only option to deal with unmanageable
financial difficulties. The bankruptcy statutes summarized above
reflect the unitary treatment of community assets and debts in
community property states when one or both spouses file a
bankruptcy case. Even if only one spouse files, community debts
generally are recoverable from all community property, so all
community property must be in the estate to be administered for
community creditors. These rules make sense for an intact
marriage where the parties are cooperating with each other and
have been pooling their assets and debts all along. Most couples in
this situation file a joint case anyway, and, unless there is a
disparity either in their assets or creditors, the joint case will be
administered as if it were a single case.'o
But, even though people are still legally married, own
community property assets, are incurring community debts, and are
earning community property wages, their interests may diverge.
This is likely to occur if they are separated and not yet divorced.
Since marital disputes frequently have financial underpinnings, and
many couples have one member who is less fiscally responsible
than the other, these divergent interests may arise even before
separation. When this occurs, and bankruptcy ensues for one or
both, the unitary treatment of community assets and debts may
bring surprising results for the spouses. Creditors may be in for a
few surprises, .too, when rules for community property apply to
9. The author was very active in this debate, having served on the
Wisconsin State Bar Committee, a committee formed to analyze several
proposals for the Act. Few women joined in her public criticism of the Act,
which frequently focused on the application of marital property debt collection
rules and the fact that women earned significantly less than men. The Wisconsin
Legislature enacted the Marital Property Reform Act, 1983 Act 186, which
became effective on January 1, 1986. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.001-766.97
(West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 31). The Wisconsin legislation is based on the
Uniform Marital Property Act, as approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 19, 9A
U.L.A. 103 (1998).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 302 (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P.1015(b); see In re Ageton,
14 B.R. 833, 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981) (community property in both estates
must be administered as if consolidated); In re Hicks, 300 B.R. 372, 378 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 2003) (estates of debtors who filed jointly had to be administered
separately because wife had separate property; community property was in both
estates).
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spouses whom the creditors have treated as independent
individuals.
In a perfect world, legislators or lawmakers would test fact
situations to see if a proposed law, when applied to certain
common and uncommon fact situations, achieves the desired
result. After enactment, when a court is required to apply the law,
it must apply it to the facts as they are found. Most of the time, the
result is predictable and inevitable. When it is not, one can only
wonder if the result is really what the lawmakers had in mind.
A. 11 U. S.C. § 541(a) (2)-Property of the Estate
Kapila v. Morgan (In re Morgan)" exemplified the perfect
storm of issues that arises when community property and
bankruptcy intersect. Teddy and Moritta Morgan were married in
Wisconsin. During their marriage, they had three children and
accumulated a small amount of property, including a modest house
titled in both names. Pursuant to Wisconsin law, all property they
accumulated while married in Wisconsin was presumed to be
marital property (the Wisconsin term for community property), and
no one argued otherwise.12 Management and control had to be joint
because the property was a homestead titled in the names of both
spouses.
The marriage did not last, but divorce was not immediate.
Nevertheless, Teddy moved to Florida, leaving Moritta and the
children in the family home. Unbeknownst to her, he filed a
bankruptcy case in Florida.
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)(A), all of Teddy's
community property, including the house Moritta and the children
occupied, went into his estate to be administered by the trustee for
the benefit of all community creditors. Most of Teddy's creditors
probably were community creditors. He might have incurred some
separate creditors in Florida, but the outcome of the administration
is not pertinent here.
Wisconsin law provides that marital property is accumulated
only "during marriage," which is defined as the period during
which the spouses are domiciled in Wisconsin,' 4 so property Teddy
11. 286 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2002).
12. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.001(2), 766.01(5), 766.31(2) (West,
Westlaw through 2011 Act 31).
13. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 706.02 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 31)
(requiring two signatures to convey a homestead).
14. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.01(8) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 31); see
also CAL. FAM. CODE § 771 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 138 of 2011 Reg. Sess.
2011] 149
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or Moritta acquired after he moved to Florida would not be marital
property. This provision did nothing to change the classification of
the house, however. That was in Teddy's bankruptcy estate. Of
course, Teddy was required to give notice of his bankruptcy to
creditors having community claims incurred by Moritta, but,
because they were obviously not communicating about such
matters, he probably did not.'5
Sometimes, spouses are separated for long periods of time
without obtaining a divorce. A divorce is an expensive and
emotionally upsetting experience, and unless one of the spouses
needs something from the other, like financial support or
cooperation in raising children, it might be delayed or never
undertaken. Moritta did not put off the divorce forever, and she
filed for divorce from the missing Teddy in Wisconsin. She asked
for the house as part of the property division, and it was granted to
her by default. Unfortunately for her, Teddy had already filed his
bankruptcy case, and the house she wanted was part of his
bankruptcy estate. The state court had no jurisdiction to order
transfer of title of an asset that neither she nor Teddy owned. She
also did not request relief from the automatic stay to have the state
court determine property division. 16 The full ownership of the
house that was awarded to her by the divorce court was void.17
When someone other than the debtor has possession of
property of the estate, the trustee may request that the property be
turned over to the trustee to administer. Without question, the
bankruptcy court had to order turnover. Moritta was no longer a
co-owner, and her only right was to purchase the house from the
estate at the same price that would be obtained from a third party.19
She would have to pay the full value of the asset, which she
undoubtedly would have found unfair-not to mention a financial
and Ch. 8 of 2011-2012 1st Ex. Sess.) (California rules for property acquired
after parties have separated).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 342(a) (2006); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (2006).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006). The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 expanded exceptions to the automatic stay, but obtaining
a division of property still requires relief from the stay. See 11 U.S.C. §
362(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2006).
17. In re Wardrobe, 559 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Myers, 491
F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. White, 466 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th
Cir. 2006).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2006); see also In re Petersen, 437 B.R. 858 (D.
Ariz. 2010) (debtor's estranged non-filing husband had to turn over community
property to the trustee, but he was allowed to offset amount the divorce court
had ordered to be turned over to him pre-petition).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 363(i), (j) (2006).
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hardship-when she previously owned at least half, and she
thought she owned the entire house.
Wisconsin has a $75,000 (then $40,000) homestead exemption,
and one might think Moritta could benefit from that. After all, the
same creditors entitled to file community claims in Teddy's
bankruptcy case would not be able to reach an exempt homestead
in a collection action against either of them under state law, or if
Moritta as sole owner of the same house had filed her own
bankruptcy case. Again, application of the bankruptcy statutes
worked to Moritta's detriment. Only "an individual debtor may
exempt from property of the estate" certain assets.20 Moritta was
not the debtor; Teddy was. Teddy could not claim a homestead
exemption in a Wisconsin homestead (we have no reason to
believe he tried) because Florida has opted out of federal
exemptions, and Florida homestead law does not allow claiming
out-of-state real estate as a homestead. 2 1 Even if Moritta filed her
own bankruptcy case, the house was not property of her estate, so
there would be nothing for her to exempt.
Does this mean Teddy meant to deprive Moritta and their
children of a place to live? No evidence suggests that he did. Does
it mean Congress intended that people who have de facto dissolved
their marriages should lose their houses? Probably not. But, such is
the result when community property rules in bankruptcy are
applied to a very common fact situation in today's society.
B. 11 U.S. C. § 101 (7)-Community Claims
As the definition states, a creditor has a community claim if
there is any type of community property that could be recovered
under state law to satisfy the claim, even if no such property is
owned by the spouses or is in the estate. Important rights go along
with this classification, such as the right to receive money from the
estate, to object to a plan, and to object to the discharge. The
debtor will need to analyze each creditor's rights under state law
with respect to types of community property recoverable for
collection. All community and separate creditors of the debtor
spouse must be listed, as well as all community creditors of the
nondebtor spouse.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2006).
21. FLA. CONST. art. 10 § 4; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 222.20, 222.01 (1998 and
Supp. 2010); see also In re Sanders, 72 B.R. 124 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987)
(holding that the homestead exemption does not have extraterritorial effect).
22. The author, who was also the judge in this case, met the trustee at a
conference. He informed me, to my sincere relief, that the case was settled and
Moritta got to keep the house.
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For most debts incurred during marriage, such as contract
debts, this is easy. Most of these creditors can clearly recover from
community property. Even debts carved out under state law as
limited in the property available for satisfaction may have some
type of community property available, so surprising categories of
debts meet the definition. 23
Once the status of the creditor has been established, the
creditor is entitled to notice of the bankruptcy.24 For debtors who
cannot obtain this information from an estranged spouse, there is a
risk that the debt will be excepted from discharge if the creditor
has no actual notice in time to exercise certain rights with respect
to the debtor or the debtor's non-filing spouse.25
Case law has revealed that some surprising creditors might
have community claims. For example, in In re Silver,26 the
debtor's non-filing spouse committed a tort during marriage that
made him subject to a $24 million judgment. The wife was not
named in that suit, and the judgment did not determine whether it
was a community debt or a separate debt. The wife filed a
bankruptcy case after the parties were divorced. The husband's
creditor filed an adversary proceeding to revoke her discharge, and
the debtor challenged the creditor's standing as a community
claimant. The court noted that, under New Mexico law, there is a
presumption that debts arising during the marriage are presumed to
be community debts, even tort debts, for which the community is
liable. Notably, the wife did not present evidence that this was a
separate debt. Therefore, the creditor had standing, and her
discharge was revoked.
23. But see In re Trammell, 399 B.R. 177 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007). A car
titled in the non-debtor spouse's name was "sole management community
property" under Texas law and was not in the debtor's estate under 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(2)(B) because the asset could only be recovered by a creditor of the
debtor's spouse. It could not be recovered by a creditor having a claim against
the debtor or against both spouses. Although the issue in that case was relief
from the automatic stay (which did not apply since the car was not property of
the debtor's estate) and not the status of the creditor as a community claimant, it
appears that the car creditor would qualify as having a community claim in the
debtor's case. The car creditor could recover from the income of the non-debtor
title holder. His income was community property; therefore, the car creditor
could-hypothetically, at least-recover from the spouse that would not be
liable under Texas law. See also In re Nahat, 278 B.R. 108 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2002) (holding the non-filing spouse's earned income was a "special" type of
community property not available for recovery of claims against the debtor and
not property of debtor's estate).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 342(a) (2006); In re Schweitzer, 111 B.R. 792, 798-99
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (2006).
26. 367 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2007).
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The court focused on the classification of a debt incurred
during marriage, which could have been either a separate or
community tort. The creditor also based its standing on the fact
that there was property in Mrs. Silver's bankruptcy estate that had
been transferred to her pursuant to the spouses' marital settlement
agreement at the time of their pre-petition divorce. This transferred
property was probably former community property, but once it was
divided by the divorce before the bankruptcy filing, it should have
been solely owned by the debtor and no longer community
property. At the time of filing, former community property or a
former spouse might have been liable under state law for a debt
incurred by the debtor's former husband, but the assets she
received in the divorce were not community property. Community
property can be held only by spouses, and this debtor was no
longer married. The bankruptcy court, which the Tenth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed,27 seemed to be saying "once
a community debt, always a community debt." Such an
interpretation is questionable because it does not track the statutes
but rather illustrates how complicated the analysis can be.
Suppose the Silvers' marriage remained intact. The distinction
between a community tort and a separate tort might not have made
a difference. A community tort would, of course, have been a
community claim. Under New Mexico law, a separate tort may be
satisfied first from the incurring spouse's separate property, and if
that property is insufficient, it can be satisfied from the incurring
spouse's interest in community property. 28 The non-debtor's
interest in community property is still community property, so the
separate liability would meet the definition of a community claim.
It might be subject to disallowance if the non-debtor's separate
property were adequate to satisfy it, but until then, it would be a
community claim.
27. In re Silver, Nos. NM-07-054, 7-96-11878-SS, 2007 WL 2915042
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. Oct. 2, 2007).
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-10 (West, Westlaw current through the First
Regular Session of the 50th Legislature (2011)); see also In re Oliphant, 221
B.R. 506 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1998). Arizona law establishes personal liability for a
community debt after divorce that can be recovered from the debtor's separate
property (i.e., anything received in the property division or acquired thereafter)
and from the debtor's interest in community property of a new community. Had
the non-incurring, non-bankrupt spouse in this case remarried and thereafter
filed a bankruptcy case (or the new spouse did so), the creditor would have a
community claim in the bankruptcy of either the non-incurring spouse or the
new spouse of the non-incurring spouse. This occurs because the personal
liability that followed the non-incurring spouse could be recovered from the new
community, a bizarre result in a case in which neither spouse incurred the debt.
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Every party to a marriage comes with baggage, and a spouse
that has been married before or has children of a prior relationship
often has more baggage than usual. Such was the case in In re
Pfalzgraf2 9 The spouses originally filed a joint case. However, the
husband had a substantial child support obligation to a former
spouse who filed a proof of claim. Under section 1322(a)(2), a
chapter 13 plan shall provide for full payment of priority debts, and
child support was a priority debt even before it was elevated to first
priority by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act as a domestic support obligation. Given the
couple's income, the claim was too large to be paid as a priority
claim at 100%, so the husband dismissed his case. His former
wife's claim was still a community claim in the present wife's
case. Her claim qualified as a community claim because under
Wisconsin law, a form of community property-property that
would have been the husband's property but for the current
marriage-would be subject to recovery for his pre-marriage child
support obligation. However, the obligation was not a priority debt
in the wife's chapter 13 case. The former spouse was not the
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, so the claim did not
have to be paid in full. The wife was able to confirm a plan.
The federal government has even broader rules for collection
from community property, thus enhancing the chance it will be a
community claimant in a case. For federal income taxes, for
example, it can recover the debtor's one-half interest in community
property, regardless of limitations imposed by state law. Also, if
state law provides for recovery by a creditor of more than the
debtor's one-half interest in community property-perhaps for all
of a liable spouse's community property earnings-the tax creditor
has those remedies as well. 30
C. 11 U.S.C § 524(a) (3)-Community Property Discharge
If one spouse in a community property state receives a
discharge, the after-acquired community property of both spouses
is thereafter protected from recovery for community claims. I This
29. 236 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1999).
30. See, e.g., In re Field, 440 B.R. 191 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009); In re Whitus,
240 B.R. 705, 708 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1999) (citing Medaris v. United States,
884 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1989)).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (2006). provides, in relevant part:
(a) A discharge in a case under this title--
(3) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation
of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect or recover
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is consistent with having all community property included in the
estate and allowing recovery for all community claims. However,
creditors who treat spouses as individuals might be in for a
surprise. In In re Strickland,32 the wife hired the attorney-creditors
to represent her in custody proceedings concerning her children
from a prior marriage. They failed to identify the debt she owed
them as a separate debt. Her current husband filed a bankruptcy
case, and the wife's debt to the attorneys was a community claim.
Thus, upon his discharge, the community discharge provision of
section 524(a)(3) applied, and they could not recover their fees
from the couple's community property. The court did observe,
however, that the wife remained liable and only certain property
was protected. Therefore, if she possessed or acquired any separate
property, that property would be subject to recovery.33
Even if a debtor receives a general discharge, certain debts are
not subject to discharge.34 Some debts, such as for support,
maintenance, property division, driving while intoxicated, or
restitution as part of a criminal sentence, are excepted from
discharge without any further action by the creditor. Student loans
require an adversarial proceeding brought by the debtor to be
discharged. Also, some debts require a timely adversary
proceeding brought by the creditor; otherwise, these are
discharged. This latter type includes certain intentional torts, such
as fraud, theft, embezzlement, defalcation in a fiduciary capacity,
and willful and malicious injury.
Section 524(a)(3) protects both spouses' interests in after-
acquired community property, even if only one spouse files.36 On
from, or offset against, property of the debtor of the kind specified in
section 541(a)(2) of this title that is acquired after the commencement
of the case, on account of any allowable community claim, except a
community claim that is excepted from discharge under section 523,
1228(a)(1), or 1328(a)(1), or that would be so excepted, determined in
accordance with the provisions of sections 523(c) and 523(d) of this
title, in a case concerning the debtor's spouse commenced on the date
of the filing of the petition in the case concerning the debtor, whether
or not discharge of the debt based on such community claim is waived.
32. 153 B.R. 909 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1993).
33. Id. at 911-12; see also In re Moore, 318 B.R. 679 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
2004) (holding an automatic stay does not prevent discovery of assets that may
be subject to recovery).
34. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 1328(a) (2006).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c), (d).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (2006); see also In re Dyson, 277 B.R. 84 (Bankr.
M.D. La. 2002) (holding a chapter 13 discharge of one spouse also protects both
spouses' interests in after-acquired community property).
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the other hand, if a debt is excepted from discharge on account of
the conduct of one spouse, the protection of after-acquired
community property does not apply to either spouse's interest in
community property.37 The community property discharge is
denied even if the innocent spouse also files a bankruptcy case.38
The denial of the general discharge for one spouse also denies
protection of both spouses' interest in after-acquired community
property.3 9
If one spouse has committed an act that requires a creditor to
file an adversary proceeding that would result in a non-
dischargeable debt, such as fraud, the determination of non-
dischargeability has to be made when the first spouse files (or
when a joint case is filed). If this were not the case, the spouses
could enjoy the benefit of the innocent spouse's discharge, which
would protect both halves of the community property assets. The
wrongdoing spouse would never have to file a bankruptcy case.
If the wrongdoing spouse is the first to file, or if the spouses
file a joint case, the creditor's course of action is clear. The
creditor must file an adversary proceeding within the time limits
set by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(a). But, if the innocent spouse files,
the Code provides that the creditor of the wrongdoing spouse must
file an adversary proceeding objecting to the hypothetical
discharge of the non-filing spouse. 40 This can be a trap for
creditors who fail to object.
Such was the case in In re Costanza.4 1 The debtor's innocent
wife filed a chapter 7 case, about which the creditors knew, and
she received her discharge. The community property discharge
took effect. Then, the husband filed, and the creditors filed an
adversary proceeding objecting to the dischargeability of their
37. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (2006); see, e.g., In re Kimmel, 367 B.R. 174,
180 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that a creditor must take action in an
innocent spouse's bankruptcy case to collect a pre-petition community claim
from after-acquired community property); In re Strickland, 153 B.R. 909, 912
(Bankr. D. N.M. 1993) (noting a creditor must proceed against non-filing spouse
in hypothetical case); In re LeSueur, 53 B.R. 414, 416 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985)
(finding "the economic sins of either spouse shall be visited upon the
community").
38. See In re Grimm, 82 B.R. 989, 994 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1988) (holding
that marital property in which an innocent debtor wife has an interest may be
reached to satisfy the debt of wrongdoing debtor husband).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 524(b) (2006).
40. See Kimmel, 367 B.R. at 181 (time limits under Fed. R. Bankr. P.
4007(c) apply). The rule does not refer to the hypothetical discharge, but it may
be inferred by the reference in section 524(a)(3) to the date of filing of the filing
spouse.
41. 151 B.R. 588 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1993).
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claim on account of his fraud. The court held they had failed to
object to his hypothetical discharge in the wife's earlier case, so
the community property discharge applied in spite of their timely
objection in his case. However, the court noted "'[T]he Devil
himself could effectively receive a discharge in bankruptcy if he
were married to Snow White.' To this I would add: if he does not
treat her better than his creditors, she will, by divorcing him, deny
his discharge.A 2
D. 11 U.S.C. § 522-Exemptions
Unlike the other issues discussed in this article, there is no
specific exemption provision for community property. This means
that debtors, trustees, creditors, and courts must somehow
harmonize a statute that pulls all community property of both
spouses into one spouse's estate with an exemption statute that
allows only the debtor's interest in an asset be claimed exempt.43
Section 522(b) provides that only "an individual debtor may
exempt from property of the estate" certain property allowed under
state or federal law, whichever is applicable. If the debtor has a
non-filing spouse, the spouse who is not a bankruptcy debtor
cannot claim an asset exempt. If all of the community property
asset is in the debtor's estate, as was the case in In re Homan, and
if the debtor does not claim the asset as exempt, the non-filing
spouse has no way to remove the asset from the estate. State
homestead laws cannot supersede the federal law in this instance.45
The result was particularly harsh in Homan because, like the
Morgan case described above, the debtor's estranged spouse was
the one who resided in the house, not the debtor. Also, since the
debtor had filed a claim of exemptions, she was not allowed to
supplement his claim.46
Not all debtors, of course, are adversaries with a joint debtor or
non-filing spouse. The debtor in In re DeHaan,47 tried to claim
42. Id. at 590 (citing Alan Pedlar, Community Property and the Bankruptcy
Act of 1978, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 349, 382 (1979)).
43. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (2006), with 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2006).
44. 112 B.R. 356 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989).
45. Id. at 359-60. But see In re Perez, 302 B.R. 661 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003)
(holding a debtor could claim exemptions for himself and his non-filing spouse
because Arizona law allows either spouse to act for the benefit of the
community).
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2006). If the debtor does not file a list of
property claimed exempt, a dependent of the debtor may file a list. However,
here the debtor filed his own list.
47. 275 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2002).
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exemptions on behalf of his non-filing spouse because her interest
in community property was in his estate. However, this was
disallowed because she was not the individual debtor. Similarly,
the chapter 13 debtor in In re Manso48 was not allowed to claim an
exemption in his wife's community property car, even though it
was in his estate, and her income was necessary to fund his plan.
Filing a joint case does not always solve the problem. The wife in
In re Bryan49 was not allowed to claim a tools-of-the-trade
exemption in community property tools because they were not
tools of her trade-only her joint debtor husband's.
Hypothetically, if only she had filed, and his tools were in her
estate, none of the value of the tools could have been claimed.
A literal reading of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) appears to limit a debtor
to one half of the value of each potentially exempt community
property asset.5 0 This is the debtor's interest in exempt assets, and
the non-filing spouse's interest would then go to pay claims in the
debtor's case. In practice, this is more likely to be the case when an
asset is easily divisible, such as a bank account, or the asset would
be sold. However, when the asset cannot be divided, such as an
exempt community property house or car, there is no way the
debtor can remove half of the asset from the estate. As a
community property interest is a non-divisible interest in an entire
asset, the only way to make the claim of exemption meaningful is
to allow the entire asset to be removed from the estate.5 1
III. THE BOTTOM LINE
Society has changed since the concept of community property
was conceived. Men and women are more likely independent
today. Indeed, many people find good reasons to marry that have
nothing to do with money. Still, about half of all marriages end in
48. 348 B.R. 74 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2005).
49. 126 B.R. 108 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1991).
50. In re Victor, 341 B.R. 775, 781 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2006) (holding a
debtor may exempt her one-half interest in community property, while the whole
of the property is included in the bankruptcy estate); see also In re Page, 171
B.R. 349, 352 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1994) (claim of exemption was not timely
objected to, but debtor was allowed only to avoid lien on what should have been
his exempt interest, i.e., one-half of the community property funds in the estate).
51. See In re Griffith, 449 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2011) (allowing
claim of exemption in entire community property asset "at least in the context of
assets which are not fungible or easily divisible"); In re Vanderhei, 449 B.R.
359 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2011) (same); In re Xiong, No. 05-43121-svk, 2006 WL
1277129 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 3, 2006) (denying trustee's motion for turnover
because debtor's undivided one-half interest in the whole of the community
property assets was not divisible).
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divorce. Serial marriages are more common today than they were
when the concept of community property was born. This means
financial interests, such as interests in property and debts, are more
often brought to the marriage. Parents may have an interest in
benefitting children of a prior relationship. Both women and men
have opportunities to accumulate wealth and debts so spouses'
economic relationships may be more complex than a default
system that provides for total sharing of assets and debts that
accumulate during a marriage. The effects of community property
rules can be altered by agreement, of course, but these agreements
can be expensive and unsettling for the relationship. Also, spouses
are often legally unsophisticated about the effects of community
property until it is too late. This is the fate of many people who
find themselves in financial trouble or in bankruptcy. Thus, for
many marriages and individuals, the community property rules
reflect a concept whose time has passed.

